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The United States witnessed an increase in pre-tax inequality, a rise
in the wealth-to-income ratio, and an extraordinary rise in top income
inequality in the last four decades. However, income and wealth tax rates
did not increase. To explain this, we build a political economy model
in which people care about fairness and approve of getting rich due to
creating value rather than extracting value from others. Simulations and
calibrations show that rational voters can allow for low levels of redistri-
bution even as they observe a sharp increase in inequality.
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1 Introduction
Why did pre-tax inequality increase and taxation decrease in the United States
from the 1980s on? Why has the wealth-to-income ratio grown without the
people demanding more redistribution (Piketty, 2013)? If income tax rates
result from informed peoples policy choices, why did taxation in the U.S. not
increase along with the increase in skill premia? As the mean voter income
gets lower than the mean, we should have observed a rise in taxation. Instead,
tax rates permanently decreased in the 80s. What is more interesting, such
a decrease seems to correlate with the view that hard work rather than luck
determines income (GSS, 2020). Therefore, as disparities in income due to a
more skewed distribution of returns to abilities increased, taxation decreased,
increasing inequality in the American economy and society.
We think this is a clear case in which the voters must have perceived in-
equality as fair. As claimed in Alesina and Angeletos (2005) and Alesina et al.
(2012), individuals view enrichment as acceptable if it comes from the higher
ability to create value through hard work. Instead, they view purely extractive
redistributions as unfair.
We conjecture that events in the 1980s (globalization, technological change,
etc.) caused an increase in the returns to highly skilled individuals abilities
and decreased the returns to less-skilled individuals in the U.S., thus widening
inequality. These events generated a rise in wage polarization (see Acemoglu,
(2002), Author (2014) and Cozzi and Impullitti (2016)). Consequently, they
have induced a change in ideology and the preferences for redistribution.
This paper is related to two strands of literature. First, we build on the
work of Alesina and Angeletos (2005) and Alesina et al. (2012), as we assume
that individuals care about fairness and are willing to vote for a higher level of
redistribution if they believe that income rises were unfair. While an increase
in income and wealth due to abilities and e¤ort is considered fair as they create
value, an increase in income depending on zero-sum luck is unfair. It unequally
redistributes wealth rather than making any value. After the seminal work by
Alesina and Glaeser (2004) described the many di¤erences in economic ideology
between U.S. and Europe, the impact of fairness in determining voting pref-
erences has been studied extensively, both empirically and theoretically. More
recently, the result of ideology in shaping political and redistributive prefer-
ences has been explored by Alesina et al. (2018), Almås et al. (2020), and
Roth and Wohlfart (2018). Alesina et al. (2018) study the e¤ects of optimism
and pessimism in the U.S. and various European countries, nding that left-
wing voters are more pessimistic about the scale of social mobility. Almås et
al. (2020) provide a social policy experiment comparative study between the
U.S. and Norway, showing that American and Norwegian di¤er signicantly in
their fairness views. That overall fairness is a more critical factor for accepting
inequality compared to e¢ciency. Finally, Roth and Wohlfart (2018) nd that
individuals who experienced inequality are less in favour of redistribution and
related to their views about fairness.
Di¤erently from the existing works on the impact of beliefs about fairness
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on redistribution, we build a model that generates a Pareto tail distribution for
high levels of wealth and shows how a skill premium change is responsible for
decreasing taxation and increasing inequality. Hence, our work also speaks to
Benhabib et al. (2011) and Benhabib et al. (2019). In particular, we follow
Benhabib et al. (2011) in proving that the tail of the stationary distribution of
wealth follows a Pareto Law.
Recently, especially after Piketty (2014) opened a lively debate, there has
been a renewed interest in studying the shape and determinants of the right tail
of income distribution (see for example Atkinson et al. (2011), Kuhn and Ríos-
Rull, (2016), and Vermeulen (2016)). Several mechanisms can generate power
laws in economics (see Gabaix, 2009). The literature has identied multiple
channels that can shape the wealth distributions tail into exhibiting Pareto
properties. One of the main canals is due to shocks to individuals endowments:
Castaneda et al. (2003) nd that uninsured idiosyncratic shocks to individuals
endowments of e¢ciency labour units are inuential in shaping the right tail of
income distribution. Similarly, Benhabib et al. (2011) identify capital risk as a
driver for the Pareto tail, and Benhabib et al. (2019) focus on skewed earnings,
di¤erential saving rates across wealth levels, and idiosyncratic stochastic returns
to wealth, with the latter being the strongest candidate in explaining the U.S.
distribution. Nirei and Aoki (2016) solve a similar model numerically. Cagetti
and De Nardi (2006) and Quadrini (2000) use a similar idiosyncratic shock on
entrepreneurial risk.
Therefore, our work bridges the two strands of literature. To the best of
our knowledge, it provides the rst model that can incorporate both preferences
for fairness and a distribution of wealth that approximates a Pareto Law, thus
allowing an investigation of the e¤ects of ideology in shaping the preferences
for redistribution for signicant levels of inequality. This article shows how the
increase in inequality in the U.S. in the past 40 years, with a simultaneous
redistribution decrease, results from a combination of increased skill premia
and fairness as a driver for redistributive preferences. While it is not entirely
possible to solve the model mathematically, we provide simulations focused on
the e¤ects of changes in skill premia and changes in levels of luck, showing that
for redistribution to decrease, voters must be driven by an appetite for fairness
rather than equality. Finally, we calibrate the model on U.S. data, recreating
the evolution of tax, wealth, top wealth, and wealth to income ratio between
1975 and 2015.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 presents some stylized
facts, Section 3 presents the model, section 4 simulates the models and calibrates
them to U.S. data, and Section 5 concludes.
2 Stylized Facts
During the last decades, the cost of trade has decreased substantially as a result
of technological improvements. Both air and maritime freight transport have
seen a substantial decline in prices. According to Hummels (2007), a signicant
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proportion of the decrease in air freight cost was due to the jet engines intro-
duction between 1957 and 1972, which increased fuel e¢ciency. Moreover, the
reduction in revenues pairs with a substantial increase in the number of goods
transported. As a result, the decrease in transportation costs and the rise in
globalization a¤ected trade as a percentage of GDP, causing a substantial in-
crease over the years. Simultaneously, there has been a change in the US skill
premium (see Cozzi and Impullitti (2016)): an increase in trade and interna-
tional competition can polarize skill premia and increase inequality. However,
if voters were individualistic, following such an increase in skill premium, we
should have observed a steady rise in taxation, redistributing wealth towards
the workers penalized by technological changes and globalization. However, the
opposite happened. While in 1981, the top income tax rate in the US was 70%,
by the last year of the Reagan mandate (1989), it had dropped to 28%, de-
creasing by 60%. After that, the top income tax increased again but plateaued
around 40% (see Figure A1 in the Appendix). As a result of the change in skill
premium and taxation, inequality rose in the US: between 1980 and 1993 alone,
the Gini ratio increased by 13% (see Figure A2 in the Appendix).
Following the literature, lets assume that the trade increase was responsible
for augmented skill premium and partially responsible for the rise in inequality.
In that case, it is unclear why voters did not choose to increase taxation but
instead accepted a decrease in top income taxation and redistribution. We con-
jecture that individuals viewed that change in inequality as fair and dependent
on higher abilities rather than sheer luck.
In Figure 1, we show the change in the belief about lucks importance in
determining success in the US. We use data from the General Social Survey
(GSS), which started in 1972 and contains data available up to 2018. The
question we are interested in is: "Some people say that people get ahead by
their own hard work; others say that lucky breaks or help from other people
are more important. Which do you think is most important? 1- hard work, 2-
equally, 3- luck or help". The question was asked discontinuously from 1973 until
1987 and continuously after. We plot the average responses of all individuals
between the age of 18 and 701 for each available year since 1975. Figure 1 shows
a strong negative relation between years and the belief that success depends on
luck, with a correlation of -80%. If success depends on hard work, then the poor
are not just unlucky, but they lack the willingness to work hard.
The decline in the belief that luck is essential in life parallels the decreases in
redistribution and taxation of top income shown in Figure A1 in the appendix.
Thus, if poor people are unwilling to work hard from the voters perspective,
they do not deserve to receive help and transfers, and the increase in inequality
is perfectly acceptable.
Stylized facts show an increase in the share and level of trade in the US
over the years, which correlated with an increase in the higher education skill
premium (see Cozzi and Impullitti (2016)). Given that the median and mean
voter are poorer than the average university-educated individual, the rise in skill
1We eliminate the rst two years as they are outliers compared to the rest of the sample.
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Figure 1: Role of Luck
premium and inequality should have caused an increase in taxation. On the
other hand, top income taxation decreased over time. A possible explanation is
that individuals do not vote against inequality but somewhat against unfairness
(see Almås et al. (2020)). As a result, if inequality is fair because it reects
abilities and e¤ort, then there is no reason to reduce disparities, and taxation
should decrease.
3 The economy
The economy is populated by non overlapping generations of individuals, in-
dexed by t. The size of the population is constant, there is one active individual
per-family, and the total mass of families is normalized to one. Each individual,
indexed by i 2 [0; 1], lives for one period and has a certain level of luck, it 2 R,
and inner abilities with common average and a stochastic component, x(1+ait).
Average luck is zero, that is
Z 1
0
itdi = 0; and the stochastic component of the
abilities is normally distributed a  N(0; 2). Each individual faces a pro-
ductivity shock eit ; with   N(0; 2) , that a¤ects both income and capital
and can be interpreted as multiplicative luck: The shocks to productivity are
idiosyncratic among individuals and stochastic across generations, but are not
i.i.d. We assume that family matters and that productivity shocks are partially
inherited from the parent, following a Markov process.
Each individual i cares about consumption, cit, and how much wealth to
bequeath to the next generation, kit - which we label "capital". E¤ort, hit,
on the job enters negatively in the utility function, and it is augmented by the
productivity shock it. This assumption is necessary to guarantee a negative
income e¤ect to counterbalance the positive substitution e¤ect deriving from the
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multiplicative e¤ect of productivity shocks2 . All choice variables are constrained










with 0 <  < 1. The end of life gross wealth is:
zit = (x(1 + ait)hit + kit 1)e

it + it (2)
For the moment we assume there is no redistribution in the economy. Max-
imizing uit subject to cit + kit = wit we obtain that:




And the optimal e¤ort is hit = x(1 + ait).
3.1 Stationary Pareto Distribution of Wealth
The di¤erence equation that maps zit 1 into zit is given by:
zit = Aitzit 1 +Bit







(Ait Bit)t are therefore stochastic processes both induced by the stochastic
process (it)t; as well as depending by the individuals abilities (which have a
common mean and a stochastic component), luck (which is i.i.d.), and opti-
mizing choices on bequest and e¤ort. If Ait and Bit were i.i.d., provided the
existence of the mean of the distribution zit in each generation, it would be pos-
sible to describe (zit)t as a Kesten process (see Kesten (1973), Gabaix (1999),
and Gabaix (2009)). However, in our case not only Ait and Bit are correlated
since both depend on the same stochastic process (it)t, but both are also au-
tocorrelated due of the Markovian nature of (it)t:
Therefore, in order to prove that the tail of the stationary distribution follows
a Pareto Law, following Benhabib et al. (2011), we rst must prove that the
distribution of wealth is ergodic, so that the limit of the stationary distribution
2 In other words without this assumption we would be implying that lucky individuals
necessarily work harder than unlucky individuals.
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of (zit)t exists and is unique, and then we can apply Theorem 1 by de Saporta
(2005) to characterize the tail of stationary distribution.
Following de Saporta (2005) rst we need to make assumptions on the process
(it)t; and therefore on the induced processes (Ait Bit)t :
Assumption 1: The process (it)t is an irreducible, aperiodic, stationary
Markov chain with nite state space   = f1; :::; pg  R
, and transition
matrix Pij0 = Pr(j0 ji):
We also need to prove that (Ait Bit)t are reective processes, so that Bit is
bounded and bigger than 0, while Ait is almost always smaller than 1, with some
exception. This will guarantee that the process will converge to a stationary
distribution. We dene A( ) = fA1; :::; Apg as the state space of (Ait)t, which is
trivial since Ait is a xed proportion  of e

it : Following Benhabib et al. (2011)
we dene:
Assumption 2:   and P are such that: (i)   >> 0, (ii) PA( ) < 1, (iii)
9 i such that A(i) > 1; (iv) all the elements of the diagonal of the transition
matrix are positive Pii > 0 for any i:
This implies directly that the elements of the diagonal of the transition
matrix for A are positive. This is needed to prove that zit will converge to a
stationary distribution:
Lemma 1: Assumption 2 implies that (Ait Bit)t are reective processes.
It therefore satises: (i) (Ait Bit)t > 0, (ii) E(AtjAt 1) < 1 for any At 1; (iii)
Ai > 1 for some i = 1; :::; n.
The last step before we present Theorem 1 is to show that (Ait Bit)t satises
the regularity assumption, to guarantee the randomness of wealth.
In order for (Ait Bit)t to satisfy the regularity assumption it is su¢cient
that:
Pr(A0y +B0 = yjA0) < 1 for any y 2 R+
Proof. Lemma 1: It should be noticed that if we would have analyzed the
normalized wealth process, as for example in Gabaix (1999), then we could have
directly replace (ii) with E(A) < 1; because working with the normalized wealth
process would have guaranteed the existence of the mean for the stationary
distribution of wealth.
Following Benhabib et al. (2011) we need to show that (Ait)t and (Bit)t are
non negative and bounded in (it)t. For (Ait)t it is trivial since e

it and  are
always positive, also, given that in each period the mean of eit = 1; and that
 < 1; we guarantee that almost all Ait < 1 with some exceptions. On the other





Therefore as long as we impose that:
x2(1 + min(ait))
2min(eit)  min(it)
by truncating the tails of the normal distribution of it then consequently:
min(Bit)  0
Moreover, in each generation the mean Bt will always be positive sinceZ 1
0
itdi = 0: Given that x is a parameter and ait are drawn from the same
distribution in each year and have mean 0, ultimately Bt depends on t:
Finally, given the nature of At assumption 2ii implies directly that ii, and
Assumption 3iii also directly implies Ai > 1 for some i = 1; :::; n:
And that (Ait)t is non-lattice, so that elements log jAij are not integral
multiples of the same number3 .
Now that we proved that zit will converge to a stationary distribution and
that wealth has a random component, following Benhabib et al. (2011), we are
ready to present Theorem 1:
Theorem 1 1: Consider the wealth accumulation process:
zit = Aitzit 1 +Bit
And that (it)t satises assumptions 1 and 2, as well as the regularity condi-
tion. Then the tail of the stationary distribution of zit is asymptotic to a Pareto
law
Pr(zi > z)  rz
 











Proof. Theorem 1: Following de Saporta (2005) Theorem 1, and Benhabib et
al. (2011) Theorem 1, we need to prove that there is a  > 1 such that the
transition matrix P = diag(i)P
0 has a spectral radius 1:















) is the spectral radius of  P
0
; so that ( P
0
) = 1: Therefore
we need to prove that there exists a  that solves ( P
0
) = 1; and that such
3See de Saporta (2005), condition 2, Theorem 1.
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 > 1: Following Benhabib et al. (2011) we know that, given (i) the ergodicity
of (it)t; (ii) the Assumption 2(ii) P A( ) < 1, and (iii) the fact that (it)t is
an irreducible, aperiodic, stationary Markov chain, the proof the of Theorem 1
follows.
3.2 Taxation and Redistribution
Each generation votes on the proportional tax rate,  t, which is applied to
end-of-life gross wealth zit; tax revenues are redistributed lump sum to all in-
dividuals, and the government budget is always balanced. End of life post-tax
and transfer wealth is:
wit = (1   t)zit +Gt, (4)
where Gt =  t
Z 1
0
z0itdi is the percapita transfer.
In this case the individual utility becomes




Individuals vote on the tax rate at the beginning of life, before deciding on
e¤ort. Maximizing uit, using (1), (2), and (4), gives
hit = (1   t)x(1 + ait)
which shows the distortion on the supply of e¤ort induced by expected tax-
ation; e¤ort increases with the individual work ability and decreases in the
disutility of e¤ort.
The denition of a period needs discussion. As in Alesina et al. (2012),
the period is one generation and it is also the length of time for which the
redistributive policy cannot be changed.
3.3 Inequality and fairness
In addition to the standard utility function described above, individuals also
care about some measure of unfairness. As in Alesina et al. (2012) and Alesina
and Angeletos (2005), individuals tolerate inequality from returns to abilities
and e¤ort but oppose any inequality arising from luck and government policies,
which are not considered fair sources of income. More specically, "fair" utility
and wealth are dened as:




bwit = (x(1 + ait)hit + bkit 1)eit .
9
As a result, fair consumption, fair bequest, and fair disposable wealth are
dened as:
bcit = (1 )bzit, bkit = bzit, bzit = bwit = (x(1+ait)hit+bkit 1)eit . (6)
Uit, is then dened as:







(ujt   bujt)2dj =
1Z
0
(wjt   bwjt)2dj. (8)
and  > 0 is the parameter that measures the importance of fairness in the
economy. This representation of utility implies that individuals dislike devia-
tions from the distribution of wealth/utility. Everybody gets only the benets
from e¤ort and innate ability but tolerate inequality arising from those while
disliking inequality (or equality) arising from lack or high government interven-
tion.
The polity, which follows Alesina et al. (2012), is presented in the appendix.
3.4 Equilibrium
After simple substitutions, and momentarily neglecting the party L bias com-































2(1   t) + kst 1)e






2(1   t) + kjt 1)e

it)dj   (x2(1 + ait)








Lemma 2. In pairwise majority voting, there exists a unique equilibrium in











The proof of Lemma 2 follows directly from Alesina et al. (2012).
The same equilibrium policy variable would also be chosen by a biased social





with each individuals indirect utility function (where e¤ort, consumption,
and bequest are all optimal) being weighted inversely to vulnerability, 1='i,
to party-related attributes. In the special case in which individuals have the
same densities 'i = ', Lemma 1 implies that 

t = argmaxt W ( t) . Note
that, from eq. (9), the equilibrium tax rate t depends on generation t   1s
bequest distribution kt 1, generation t  1s fair bequest distribution bkt 1, and
n the parameter vectors x2(1 + ait)




Under the benchmark symmetry assumption, 'i = ', and normalizing by
', we can simplify the relevant welfare function to:








The equilibrium tax rate t determines the level of capital and fair capital
for each family of the current generation. Therefore the link between di¤erent














2(1   t) + bkit 1
i
eit (13)
4Note that the distribution of (x2(1 + ait)
2)eit should be high enough relative to the
support of the distribution of i in order for end of life wealth never to be negative. See
Alesina et al. (2012).
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4 Intergenerational Dynamics
Starting from an initial vector of actual and fair wealth levels, (ki0; k̂i0)i2[0;1], we
use equations (9), problem (10), and eq.s (12) and (13), to iterate the model for
an arbitrary number of generations, and calculate the sequence of equilibrium
values of the endogenous variables of our dynamic economy for all parameter
vectors, initial wealth distributions, and initial fair wealth distributions. By
simulating the model for a su¢ciently high number of generations, we can ap-
proximate the initial steady state value of the endogenous variables associated
with each initial condition.
We generate an initial distribution of shocks i0  N(0; 
2); and a transition
matrix for the Markov chain which has all positive entries and in which the
diagonal elements, necessarily smaller than 1; have the biggest weight in each
row. We do this by generating each row of the transition matrix as a random
sequence drawn from a uniform distribution. After normalizing all the entries
to sum one, we swap the diagonal value with the highest value. In this way,
the matrix is of full rank since each row is independent and randomly assigned;
there are only positive entries; the matrix is irreducible since there is only one
class. The matrix is then aperiodic since we only need one state to be aperiodic
(1 positive element on the diagonal would be enough, but by denition, all
elements on the diagonal are necessarily > 0).
We set values for parameters x and , and draw in each period it and ait:
from two independent normal distribution5 .
Generation ts pair of distributions (kit; k̂it)i2[0;1] describe the interaction of
real and "ideal" variables at time t. More precisely, the comparison between
how society currently is - the actual distribution (kit)i2[0;1] - and how society
thinks it "should be" - the fair distribution (k̂it)i2[0;1] - sets the goals of the
political action; together with the method of political competition - i.e. pairwise
majority voting - this describes the political ideology prevailing for generation
t in that economy. The resulting political equilibrium generates the evolution
of (kit+1; k̂it+1)i2[0;1], and therefore the political ideology (i.e. policy goals)
prevailing in the next generation. Thus we trace the evolution of ideology,
fairness and redistribution, as well as the aggregate GDP per capita.
4.1 Evolution of top Capital over time
Figure 2 shows a simulation of the model the looks into the e¤ect of an ex-
pansion of the abilities distribution. We assume that there are two economies:
A and B, which share the same parameters for the rst 130 periods prior the
shock, to reach the steady state6 . Following a 10% increase in the scaling of
5For the calibration to US data we assume instead the the distribution of endowments do
not change over time.
6Each country is populated by 1,000 individuals. Since the simulations use normally dis-
tributed stochastic component of the abilities and exponential productivity shock (with a seed
to be able to replicate the results), which are idiosyncratic among individuals and stochastic
across generations, some intergenerational variation in tax and wealth is to be expected.
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the distribution of abilities in period 130, Country B (represented by the dotted
line) shows a decrease in taxation and an increase in the top income share:
Figure 2: Change in Returns to Abilities
Individuals react to the expansion in the returns to abilities by voting for a
lower level of taxation. The reason is that the increase in inequality looks fair:
as the inequality depends more on the returns to abilities, the actual distribution
of wealth becomes more closely related to the distribution of fairness considered
just. The voters reaction is to support a lower level of redistribution, thus
increasing inequality even more.
It is essential to notice that this reaction is dependent on the way ideology is
modelled: if individuals believe that wealth reects abilities, they will be willing
to decrease taxation. If, on the other hand, individuals would have thought that
luck was responsible for the increase in di¤erent returns, then the result would
have been the opposite:
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Figure 3: Change in Luck Distribution
In gure 3, we can see that an increase in luck, which has zero-sum, would
not a¤ect voters preferences in the same way. In Figure 3, the initial increase
in inequality is met by a rise in outrage for unfair disequality and an increase
in taxation, which shoots to one. Therefore, after an initial increase in the
higher to average income ratio, given by the rise in luck distribution variance,
taxation becomes so high that it decreases the higher to average income ratio
to 0. Consequently, the country gets stuck in a poverty trap with no inequality
and virtually inexistent e¤ort and capital. This result is an extreme example
but shows the importance of the ideology in the reaction to changes.
4.2 Calibration on US data
We calibrate the theoretical model on US data to show the e¤ects of distribu-
tion changes to return to abilities in the eighties. Using data from the World
Inequality Database and the NBER taxsim, we match the average tax rate, the
average wealth, the top wealth share, and the wealth to income ratio dynamics
between 1975 and 2015. To be able to create consistently replicable results and
clear gures, we x the distributions of a, , and the initial distribution of :
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Figure 4: Calibration to US data
The increase in trade and technological change started in the 1980s augmented
ability distribution variance, in the simulation, by 3%. We match the overtime
trends for the four variables. Income weighted average marginal tax rate de-
creases from 25.25% in 1975 to 22.93% in 2013. Simultaneously, average wealth
(in constant 2016 dollars) changes from $10,444 to $24,681, and the share of
the top 10% wealth from 67.29% to 73.00%. Finally, the wealth to income ra-
tio varies from 3.59% to 4.82%. Our model can closely imitate these patterns,
showing that the change in taxation and inequality in the US in the last 40
years could be attributable to an increase in returns to abilities, perceived as a
fair source of income voters.
5 Conclusions
In this paper, we have shown that the increase in inequality and the wealth
to income ratio witnessed in the past decade in the United States alongside
the decrease in overall redistribution could have resulted from a more decisive
role of individual abilities in determining peoples economic success. This e¤ect
operates through the assumed preference structure, which perceives extractive
sources of inequality as unfair and value-creating sources of inequality as fair
(Alesina and Angeletos, 2005; Alesina et al. 2012). This paper has shown that
culture matters (Cozzi, 1998) and can shape the political economy reaction to
changing economic fundamentals. In future research, it would be interesting to
compare di¤erent countries and how their ruling elites business model (Casas
15
et al. 2020) mediate the countrys adaptation to technological and international
changes and study the e¤ect that the Covid-19 pandemic will have on ideology
and redistribution.
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Appendix
Figure A1 presents the change in overtime for the tax rate for top incomes in
the US after the Second World War. Data comes from the "Federal Individual
Income Tax Rate, Adjusted for Ination" document of the US Tax Foundation.
Taxation for top income was very high in 1945, reaching a ceiling of 90%. It is
possible to observe a sharp decrease over time, rst in 1965 and then a much
more substantial reduction in the eighties during the Reagan presidency.
In 1981 the top income tax rate was 70%, and by the last year of the Reagan
mandate (1989), it had dropped to 28%. It then increased again to around 40%,
still much lower than the tax rate during the sixties and seventies.
Figure A1: US Top Income Tax
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Figure A2 shows the change in the Gini Ratio for families in the US between
1967 and 2019. Data come from the St. Louis Fed Archival Economic Data.
After an initial decrease in the level of inequality between 1947 and 1968, the
Gini ratio increased. The most signicant jump happened between 1980 and
1993 when the Gini Ratio increased by 13%. Therefore, while the tax rate on
top incomes presented in table A1 increased, both the skill-premium premium
and Gini Ratio were growing.
Figure A2: US Household Gini Coe¢cient
The polity
Following Alesina et al. (2012), we use a probabilistic voting model. We
assume there are two parties in the economy , for convenience we call them
"left" ( L), and "right" ( R), which simultaneously propose a tax rate P 2 [0; 1],
P = L, R. Voters express their preference and the party elected implements the
announced tax rate.
Individuals have heterogeneous degrees of party identication:
~UitP = uit   
t + (it + "t)L(P ), where P = L;R.
Where P denotes the winning party and L(P ) is 1 if P = L and 0 if P =
R. The random variable it represents individual is pro-party L bias, which







. "t is an aggregate random







. All random variables are independent. Therefore, the
19
density function of aggregate popularity of party L is  > 0, while the family-
specic density functions are 'i > 0. The correlated component of the party
identication being less variable than the individual components. It should be
noticed that the two parties commit to their tax rates before they know the
realization of the random variables; and they will choose their policies Lt and
Rt by maximizing the probability of being elected.
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